



Democratizing Capital: The History, Law And
Reform of the Community Reinvestment Act
Richard D. Marsico
New York Law School, richard.marsico@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_books
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Books by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Marsico, Richard D., "Democratizing Capital: The History, Law And Reform of the Community Reinvestment Act" (2005). Books. 50.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_books/50
Copyright © 2005 
Richard D. Marsico 
All Rights Reserved 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
Marsico, Richard, 1960-
Democratizing capital I by Richard Marsico. 
p. cm. 
Includes index. 
ISBN 0-89089-329-2 (ail<. paper) 
1. United States. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. 2. Bank loans--
Law and legislation--United States. 3. Community development--Law and 
legislation--United States. I. Title. 
KF1035.M37 2004 
346. 73 '082 l 753--dc22 
Carolina Academic Press 
700 Kent Street 
Durham, North Carolina 27701 
Telephone (919) 489-7486 
Fax (919) 493-5668 
www.cap-press.com 
Printed in the United States of America 
2004019515 
To my wife, whose support, encouragement, and enthusiasm through 
countless hours made this book possible. 
To my parents, thank you for everything. 
To my children, in the hope that they will live in a society in which 





Chapter One The Legislative History of the CRA 11 
Introduction 11 
The Purpose of the CRA 12 
CRA Enforcement 16 
Criteria for Evaluating a Bank's Record of Meeting 
Community Credit Needs 16 
Sanctions for Failing to Meet Community Credit Needs 18 
Opposition to the CRA 19 
Response to the CRA's Opponents 21 
Amendments to the CRA 23 
FIRREA Amendment 23 
FDICIA Amendment 24 
HCDA and RTCA Amendments 24 
Riegle-Neal Amendment 25 
GLBA Amendments 25 
Conclusion 28 
Chapter Two The Legal Structure of the CRA 29 
Introduction 29 
The Language of the Statute 30 
CRA Performance Standards 30 
CRA Enforcement Mechanisms 31 




Chapter Four The Second Set of CRA Regulations 
CRA Performance Evaluations 32 and the Process of Adopting Them, 1993-95 69 
Bank Expansion Applications 33 Introduction 
69 
Limited Enforcement Mechanisms 34 The 1993 Proposal 
71 
Judicial Interpretation of the CRA 35 Description of the 1993 Proposal 71 
Conclusion 42 Banking Industry Opposition to the 1993 Proposal 73 
Chapter Three The First CRA Enforcement Regime: 1977-97 43 The 1994 Proposal 75 
Introduction 43 Description of the 1994 Proposal 76 
The Federal Banking Agencies' Perspective on the CRA The Second Set of CRA Regulations 77 
and Credit Allocation 44 Performance Context 77 
The Three Key Characteristics of the First CRA Performance Tests and Evaluative Criteria 78 
Enforcement Regime 47 Large Retail Banks 78 
The Overemphasis on Efforts 47 The Lending Test 78 
The CRA Regulations 48 The Investment Test 79 
Other Regulatory Materials 49 The Service Test 79 
The Joint Statement 49 
Assigning the Overall CRA Rating to Large Retail Banks 81 
The Policy Statement on Analysis of Geographic Small Retail Banks 81 Distribution of Lending 51 
Wholesale and Limited Purpose Banks 83 TheCRAQ&A 51 
The Strategic Plan Option 84 CRA Performance Evaluation Procedures 52 Enforcem ent 
85 Lack of a Fixed Set of Quantitative and Objective 
Assigning a CRA Rating 
86 CRA Evaluative Criteria 52 
The Effect of a Bank's CRA Record 
Weak Enforcement 55 
on its Expansion Applications 
86 CRA Performance Evaluations 55 
CRA Assessment Area 
86 Inflated Ratings 55 Data Disclosure Requirements 
87 Contents of the Evaluations 56 Conclusion 
87 Bank Expansion Applications 58 Chapter Five The Second CRA Enforcement Regime: 1997-2004 89 Record of Denying Applications 58 
Introduction 
89 Lack of Quantitative and Objective Evaluative Criteria 59 
CRA Performance Evaluations 
90 The Emphasis on Efforts 62 
Lack of a Fixed Set of Evaluative Criteria 
91 Administrative Enforcement Proceedings 64 
Quantitative Measures of Lending and Quantitative 
Dissatisfaction with the First CRA Enforcement Regim e 66 
Benchmarks of Community Credit Needs 
92 
xii CONTENTS 
Subjective Standards for Comparing the Quantitative 
Measures of Bank Lending With the Quantitative 
Benchmarks of Community Credit Needs 
Misleadingly Favorable and Inconsistent Application 
of Subjective Evaluation Standards 
No Weights Assigned to Criteria 
Large Retail Banks 
Geographic Distribution of Loans 
Distribution of Loans to Borrowers at Different 
Income Levels 
Small Retail Banks 
LDR 
AA Lending 
Distribution of Loans to Persons at Different Income Levels 
Geographic Distribution of Loans 
Inconsistent and Vague Standards for Evaluating 
the Retail Lending Component of the Lending Test 
for Large Retail Banks 
Lending Within the Bank's Service Area 





From "marginally acceptable" to "poor" 




































Inconsistent and Inflated CRA Ratings for Small Retail Banks 
Outstanding 
Satisfactory 
Needs to Improve 
Substantial Noncompliance 
CRA Ratings 
Decisions on Applications 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
California 
Idaho 






Compliance Manuals and Other Regulatory Materials 
Small Retail Banks 
LDR 
Credit Extended Inside and Outside the Bank's AA 
Geographic Distribution of Loans 
Lending to Borrowers at Different Income Levels 
Large Retail Banks 
Geographic Distribution of Loans 
Distribution of Loans to Persons at Different Income Levels 
Revisions to the CRA Regulations? 
Conclusion 
Chapter Six The CRA's Effect on Democratizing Capital: 
Progress and Potential 
Expansion Applications and "CRA Challenges" 
The CRA Challenge Process 

































Efforts to Increase Lending Outside of the Bank Expansion 
or CRA Challenge Process 
CRA Special Lending Programs 
Community Economic Development Loans and Investments 
Lending Consortia 
Public/Private Partnerships 
New Investment Vehicles 
Studies About the CRA's Impact 









Chapter Seven Other Governmental Interventions in the Credit 





The Definition of Credit Allocation 
The Department of Justice's Lending Discrimination Cases 
Home Mortgage Loan Purchase Targets 
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Mandatory Loan-to-Deposit Ratios for Banks 
with Interstate Branches 
Disclosure of Information About Loans 
Initial Passage and Legislative History of HMDA 
The Impact of the Disclosure of Expanded HMDA Data 
Lending Increases Following the Disclosure 
Chapter Eight Democratizing Capital 
·Introduction 
The Proposed Criteria for Evaluating the CRA Performance 









Criteria for Evaluating Lending 176 
Quantitative Benchmarks of Community Credit Needs 177 
Credit 177 
Community 177 
Quantitative Benchmarks of Community Credit Needs 180 
Quantitative Measures of Bank Lending 182 
CONTENTS 
Objective Standards for Evaluating Bank Lending 
Lending Evaluation Comparisons 
Criteria for Evaluating Community Development Investments, 
Grants, and Services 
Criteria for Evaluating Retail Banking Services 
Applying the Proposed CRA Evaluative Criteria to a Bank 
Scoring the Bank's Performance on Lending, Community 
Development, and Retail Banking 
Lending 
Community Development Loans, Investment, Grants, 
and Services 
Retail Banking Services 
Example 
Assigning a CRA Rating to a Bank 





The Community Reinvestment Act 
Community Reinvestment Act Regulations 
Appendix Three Criteria that the Federal Banking Agencies 
Used to Evaluate CRA Performance 
Table of Cases 























The term "democratizing capital" in this book's title has two related mean-
ings, and the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") democratizes capital in 
both ways.1 The first may be analogized to voting. The CRA has democratized 
decisions about the distribution of capital by extending at least part of the de-
cision-making "franchise" to previously "disenfranchised" people, in particu-
lar low-income and minority persons.2 Second, the CRA has played a role in 
distributing loans to people-particularly low-income and minority individ-
uals-who previously did not receive loans, thus including them in the eco-
nomic mainstream and giving them the same economic opportunity as oth-
ers.3 The CRA has done this by influencing banks to make loans to low-income 
and minority individuals to purchase, refinance, or improve a home; to open 
or expand a small business; or to support a small farm.4 
The seeds for democratizing capital are contained in the statute that en-
acted the CRA. The CRA imposes on banks a "continuing and affirmative ob-
ligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they 
are chartered;'s including low- and moderate-income ("LMI") neighbor-
hoods.6 The CRA places enforcement of this obligation in the hands of four 
federal administrative agencies that regulate banks (the "federal banking agen-
cies" or the "agencies") .7 The CRA requires these agencies to examine each 
bank periodically to determine whether it is helping to meet community credit 
needs, to issue a written public report-including a rating-evaluating the 
bank's CRA performance, and to take the bank's CRA record into account 
when considering certain bank expansion applications.a When a bank files one 
of these expansion applications, any member of the public may file comments 
with the federal banking agency that regulates the bank opposing the applica-
tion on the basis that the bank has failed to meet its CRA obligations. Mem-
bers of the public, and in particular community-based organizations operat-
ing in LMI, predominantly minority, and inner-city neighborhoods 
(collectively "redlined neighborhoods") have used this opportunity to file com-
ments opposing bank merger applications. 
3 
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The seeds for democratizing capital have borne fruit. The opportunity for 
disenfranchised members of redlined neighborhoods to comment on a bank's 
CRA record when it files an expansion application has given them a powerful 
voice in decisions about the distribution of loans.9 Banks, which are generally 
sensitive to bad publicity and risk-averse in their expansion applications, are 
anxious to have good CRA records both as good public relations and to en-
sure approval of their expansion applications. Public comments, and the delay 
and risk they cause to bank expansion plans, have brought banks to the bar-
gaining table with community groups, resulting in bank pledges to lend more 
than one trillion dollars to LMI and predominantly minority neighborhoods 
nationwide.10 Even if banks do not have expansion plans in the immediate fu-
ture, their desire for good public relations, their discovery that CRA-related 
lending can be profitable, and their desire to prevent comments opposing fu-
ture expansion applications have motivated them to change their lending prac-
tices, introduce new loan products, and partner with community groups to 
make lendjng to LMI and minority persons and neighborhoods _part of their 
business strategies. 
Despite its success in democratizing capital, the CRA has not reached its 
full potential. There remains a disproportionate distribution of costly sub-
prime lending in LMI and predominantly minority neighborhoods and a dis-
proportionate percentage of low-income persons who do not participate in 
the bankjng system. 
The thesis of this book has four parts. First, one of the main reasons the 
CRA has not reached its full potential for democratizing capital is that the fed-
eral bankjng agencies utilize subjective standards for evaluating the CRA per-
formance of banks. Such standards limit the power of the franchise the CRJ\ 
extends to LMI and minority persons and the amount of capital they receive 
because subjective standards make it difficult to hold a bank accountable for 
a poor CRA record or to know how much lending a bank should be doing. 
Second, in contrast to subjective standards for evaluating CRA perform-
ance, a fixed set of criteria composed of quantitative measures of bank lend-
ing, quantitative measures of community credit needs, and objective standards 
for evaluating bank lending would maximize the CRA's potential for democ-
ratizing capital. Such criteria would make it easier to hold a bank accountable 
for a poor CRA record and would more clearly define how much lending a 
bank should be doing. 
Third, a major reason the agencies have failed to adopt quantitative meas-
ures and objective standards for evaluating CRA performance is the agencies' 
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fear that such standards would "allocate credit." The CRA's legislative history 
makes clear that Congress did not intend the CRA to allocate credit, and the 
agencies fear credit allocation could lead to unsafe and unsound banking prac-
tices. 
The fourth part of the thesis is that it is possible to establish criteria for 
evaluating CRA performance that are composed of quantitative measures and 
objective standards that maximize the CRA's potential for democratizing cap-
ital without allocating credit. The CRA performance evaluation criteria this 
book proposes in chapter eight have been developed based on the notion that 
while the CRA is not in tended to allocate credit, it is intended to in fluence 
banks to lend more money in redlined neighborhoods, and it is permissible 
under the CRA to influence banks to lend in such areas up to the point of al-
locating credit. 
Specifically, the CRA evaluative criteria this book proposes are composed 
of three characteristics that will maximize the CRA's potential for democra-
tizing capital: quantitative measures of bank lending; quantitative benchmarks 
of community credit needs; and objective standards for determining whether 
bank lending meets credit needs. Such criteria would make it possible for 
community groups to hold banks accountable for poor CRA records and 
would help ensure that banks are distributing sufficient capital to meet com-
munity credit needs. 
The reason the CRA has not met its potential for democratizing capital and 
exploring how it might do so is the story this book tries to tell. The story be-
gins in chapter one, with the legislative history of the CRA. Congress passed 
the CRA to influence banks to make loans to redlined neighborhoods. Con-
gress intended the CRA to eliminate the bankjng practice known as "redlin-
'.ng;' which is the refusal to lend in low-income, predominantly minority, or 
mner-city neighborhoods, regardless of credit risk, 11 and to increase bank 
lending in these neighborhoods. When Congress amended the CRA and other 
bankjng laws with CRA-related provisions on six separate occasions, it took a 
number of steps to strengthen the CRA's extension of the franchise over deci-
sions about the distribution of capital, primarily through expanding the 
amount and quality of information about bank lending records that is avail-
able to the public. While Congress intended the CRA to influence banks to 
make more loans to redlined neighborhoods, Congress also stated that it did 
not intend the CRA to allocate credit, another way of stating that the CRA was 
no~ to ~e used to create lending quotas. Congress did not ban quotas, but the 
leg1slat1ve history indicates that quotas are not permissible under the CRA. 
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Based on this legislative history, the federal banking agencies may adopt cri-
teria for evaluating CRA performance that influence banks to lend up to the 
point of setting quotas. 
Chapter two describes the structure of the CRA. Reflecting its legislative 
history, the CRA is designed to influence banks to lend more money in un-
derserved neighborhoods without allocating credit. The CRA places an obli-
gation on banks to help meet community credit needs. It creates an enforce-
ment mechanism that influences banks to make loans to satisfy this obligation. 
Enforcement comes in the form of periodic evaluations of a bank's CR.A 
record by the federal banking agency that regulates it, public disclosure of in-
formation about a bank's CRA record, and scrutiny of a bank's CRA record 
by the agency that regulates it when the bank submits an expansion applica-
tion. The CRA does not, however, contain enforcement provisions that might 
lead to credit allocation, such as mandatory penalties for a bank that fails to 
satisfy its CRA obligations or the right of individuals to sue in court for CR.A 
violations. 
The story then moves, in chapter three, to the first CRA enforcement 
regime, which lasted from 1978 through mid-1997. In enforcing the CRA, the 
federal banking agencies-all of which had opposed the CRA-did not em· 
phasize the portion of the CRA or its legislative history that focused on in· 
creasing lending to redlined neighborhoods. Instead, they focused on the por-
tion of the legislative history that prohibited credit allocation. The agencies 
treated the CRA as a law that was intended to correct an information failure 
in the market. According to this theory, banks redlined because they decided 
it was not worth the expense or time to seek creditworthy borrowers in par-
ticular neighborhoods, especially LMI, inner-city, or predominantly minor-
ity communities. The agencies' perspective was that the CRA requires banks 
to seek information about lending opportunities in redlined neighborhoods 
and market loans there. The first set of CRA regulations, which were in force 
from 1978 through mid-1997, reflected this position. The criteria for evalu-
ating CRA performance in the regulations and the agencies' enforcement of 
the CRA emphasized the efforts a bank undertook to make loans in its local 
community.12 A bank's actual lending was of secondary importance to its ef-
forts to lend. When the agencies evaluated bank lending, they used vague and 
inconsistent criteria and subjective standards that made it impossible for mem-
bers of the public to know what a bank's CRA obligations were, let alone hold 
a bank to them. 
Over time, the first CRA enforcement regime generated great dissatisfac-
tion. The regime had the unfortunate distinction of generating dissension 
among the banks it regulated, the residents of redlined neighborhoods that it 
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Was intended to benefit, and the law's enforcers, the federal banking agencies 
~hemselves. 1 3 They all agreed that the CRA was enforced in an arbitrary and 
tnconsistent manner. Bankers complained that it generated unnecessary bur-
den and paperwork and subjected bank expansion plans to undue delay and 
expense. Community groups asserted that the federal banking agencies did 
not fulfill their responsibility to enforce the CRA and that the standards for 
evaluating bank lending were too vague and subjective to allow them to hold 
a bank accountable for a poor record of meeting community credit needs. 
In response to the many criticisms of the first CRA enforcement regime, 
the federal banking agencies began a rule-making process in July 1993 that 
~ulminated in new CRA regulations in April 1995 that were fully phased in by 
;ly 1997. Chapter four describes the efforts to reform the CRA regulations. 
. he new regulations made some improvements and some progress towards 
1
'.11Plementing criteria for evaluating CRA performance that consist of quan-
titative measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks of community 
credit needs, and objective terms for evaluating bank performance. Specifi-
~ally, the second set of CRA regulations eliminated the criteria that evaluated 
le~n~ effo.rts to lend and replaced them with criteria that ev~uated a _bank's 
b ding, investment, and service performance. The regulat10ns requlfe the 
ederal banking agencies to consider the extent of the bank's lending in its 
community, the geographic distribution of its loans, and its lending to per-
s~ns of different income levels. However, the regulations do not spell out 
c earJy and unambiguously how to measure bank lending, how to measure 
corninunity credit needs, or how to evaluate whether the lending meets credit 
~~~ds. Thus, despite the improvement, the new regulations fall short of ful-
ling the capital-democratizing promise of the CRA. 
The first proposed draft of the new regulations, however, came very close 
to un . 11z111g quantitative measures and benchmarks and objective standards for 
evaluating CRA performance. It had a "market share" test, which would have 
evaluated a bank's record of meeting community credit needs by comparing 
a bank's market share of loans in LMI neighborhoods (quantitative measure 
of bank lending) with its overall market share of loans (quantitative bench-
:ark of the bank's ability to meet overall community credit needs). If the 
ank's market share in LMI neighborhoods was "comparable" to its overall 
~arket share, it presumably was meeting community credit needs. There was 
a so a loan-to-deposit ratio ("LDR") test, pursuant to which the percentage of 
~ bank's deposits that it returned to the community in the form of loans 
bquantitative measure) would be compared with a 65% LDR (quantitative 
enchmark). An LDR of 65% was presumably reasonable (a quasi-objective 
standard). Finally, the proposed regulations evaluated the percentage of a 
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bank's loans in its community (quantitative measure) . If a majority of loans 
were in the bank's community (quantitative benchmark), this was "appropri-
ate." The banking industry criticized the market share and LDR tests as allo-
cating credit, and the federal banking agencies dropped them from the final 
regulations. 
The failure of the federal banking agencies to adopt CRA regulations that 
use criteria for evaluating CRA performance composed of quantitative meas-
ures and objective standards means the CRA still has a long way to go before 
reaching its potential for democratizing capital. This is borne out in chapter 
five, which investigates how the federal banking agencies have implemented 
the second set of CRA regulations. Chapter five examines CRA performance 
evaluations, agency decisions on bank expansion applications, and the agen-
cies' CRA examination manuals and other regulatory materials. Despite im-
provements in the second set of CRA regulations, the agencies continue to en-
force the CRA in a way that makes it nearly impossible for community groups 
to hold a bank accountable for a poor lending record. The agencies did not 
use a fixed set of CRA evaluative criteria, frequently employed criteria con-
sisting of a quantitative measure of bank lending and a quantitative bench-
mark of community credit needs but used subjective standards to compare 
bank lending with the benchmark, did not define the level of performance re-
quired to meet a particular subjective standard, used the subjective evaluative 
standards inconsistently and almost always in a way that favored banks, and 
did not define the weight each criterion had. The agencies' decisions on ex-
pansion applications similarly did not use a fixed set of criteria and used sub-
jective standards for evaluating bank lending. The decisions generally listed 
facts about the bank's lending, emphasized strengths and excused weaknesses, 
and did not describe the reasoning the agency employed in reaching the de-
cision. Finally, the compliance manuals do not require banking agency ex-
aminers to use a fixed set of criteria when evaluating a bank's CRA perform-
ance. 
The story next moves to chapter six, which examines the impact the CRA 
has had on distributing loans to LMI and minority persons and neighbor-
hoods. There is substantial evidence consistent with the conclusion that the 
CRA has encouraged banks to lend more money to LMI and minority persons 
and neighborhoods than they would have without the CRA. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence that the CRA has not realized its potential. LMI and minor-
ity neighborhoods receive a disproportionate share of costly subprime and 
predatory loans; many residents of such neighborhoods who received sub-
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prime loans could have received a prime loan; and a large percentage of the 
LMI persons do not even have a bank account. 
The book then moves to its final two chapters, which examine whether it 
is possible to create CRA evaluative criteria that do not allocate credit and are 
composed of quantitative measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks 
of community credit needs, and objective standards for evaluating whether 
bank lending meets community credit needs. Chapter seven examines other 
federal government interventions in the credit markets in order to define credit 
allocation more specifically and to distinguish governmental credit allocation 
from governmental efforts to influence bank lending decisions. Several ex-
amples show this difference, including the Department of Justice's enforce-
ment of the fair-lending laws, laws and regulations governing Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, laws establishing lending requirements for banks with interstate 
branches, and home mortgage-lending disclosure laws. 
Finally, chapter eight proposes CRA evaluative criteria that maximize the 
CR.Ns potential for democratizing capital. The criteria are composed of quan-
titative measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks of community 
credit needs, and objective standards for evaluating whether bank lending 
meets community credit needs. Chapter eight demonstrates that the proposed 
criteria will strengthen the franchise over lending decisions that the CRA ex-
tends to previously disenfranchised community members, will influence banks 
to lend more money to LMI and minority persons previously excluded from 
the economic system, and will not allocate credit. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE CRA 
Introduction 
The legislative history of the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA'') shows 
that the purpose of the CRA was to end the bank practice known as redlin-
ing-refusing to lend in certain neighborhoods, especially low-income, pre-
dominantly minority, and inner-city neighborhoods- due to perceived credit 
risks, and to increase the amount of money banks lend in their local com-
munities in general and in redlined neighborhoods in particular. ' The CRA 
expresses a congressional preference for banks to make loans in their local 
communities and in LMI neighborhoods and threatens sanctions for banks 
that do not comply. In using the CRA to express a preference and threaten 
sanctions, Congress intended to influence banks to lend more money in red-
lined neighborhoods. 
The legislative history of the CRA also shows that in passing the CRA, 
Congress did not intend to create a system of government-imposed credit al-
location, and equated credit allocation with lending quotas. Congress did not 
establish lending quotas, require banks to lend to particular persons or or-
ganizations, or create mandatory sanctions for failing to lend. 
Based on the legislative history, the four federal agencies that regulate 
banks2 (the "federal banking agencies" or the "agencies") may promulgate CRA 
regulations that contain criteria for evaluating the CRA performance of a bank 
that consist of quantitative measures of bank lending, quantitative bench-
marks of community credit needs, and objective standards for evaluating 
whether bank lending meets community credit needs.3 
. Th~ difference between allocating credit and influencing bank lending deci-
sions is not just semantic. It is the difference between setting mandatory quo-
11 
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tas-which Congress did not do in passing the CRA- and setting up a system 
intended to end redlining and increase lending in redlined communities, which 
Congress did in passing the CRA. Former Federal Reserve Governor Lawrence 
Lindsey made a statement that makes this distinction between influencing 
banks to lend and allocating credit through quotas: "The CRA established a na-
tional goal and put considerable power in both supervisory agencies and the 
public to enforce it but left the details of how the goal should be accomplished 
to local communities and depository institutions."4 The CRA influences banks 
to lend in redlined neighborhoods but does not specify amounts, types, terms, 
or recipients of loans. As Lindsey continued, "No one in Washington has yet 
been employed to decide how much or what type of CRA lending should be 
made in the individual communities . . . [banks] represent."5 
Congress passed six significant amendments to the CRA and three CRA-re-
lated amendments to other banking laws on six separate occasions. The provi-
sions and legislative histories of the amendments on the first five occasions 
indicate they were congressional attempts to clarify and strengthen the CRA's 
influence over bank lending decisions. They helped democratize capital by re-
quiring the federal banking agencies to disclose more information to the pub-
lic about bank lending records and the standards the agencies use to evaluate 
them. The purpose of the amendments Congress passed on the sixth occasion 
it amended the CRA and related laws is mixed. On the one hand, the amend-
ments strengthened the CRA by prohibiting banks from going into the insur-
ance or securities businesses unless they have at least a satisfactory CRA record. 
On the other hand, they weakened the CRA by limiting the frequency of CRA 
exams for small banks with satisfactory or better CRA records. The amendments 
also included a provision requiring community groups and banks to disclose 
certain CRA-related agreements they enter. While the purpose of this amend-
ment might have been to create a chilling effect on groups' efforts to comment 
on bank applications, it is not clear the amendment will have this effect. 
The Purpose of the CRA 
Congress passed the CRA in light of evidence that banks were engaged in 
two interrelated practices- redlining and capital export- which, CRA's sup-
porters argued, contributed to the deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods.6 
Redlining is the practice by which a bank draws a red line around a neigh-
borhood on a map and refuses to lend there because of perceived credit risks 
associated with the neighborhood.7 Capital export is the practice by which a 
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~~t~ :xpdorts the depos'.ts of one neighborhood's residents to other commu-
portun~iesm~kes loans. m t~ose other communities despite local lending op-
being victi1~iz~~g~es;~dentified _seve~al diff~rent types of neighborhoods as 
. . y ese practices, mcludmg LMI s minority 9 urban and 
mner-c1ty 10 old 11 d ' ' 
borhoods;') 12 Ser, an r~r.al and small towns (collectively "redlined neigh-
. enator Wilham Proxmire the CRA' . 
scribed these related t" ' s pnmary sponsor, de-prac ices: 
~=;t~nksland ~avings and loans will take deposits and instead of rein-
mg t 1em 111 that community th ill · 
th ·11 ' ey w mvest them elsewhere and 
ar::s w1 a~tu~lly or figuratively draw a red line on a map ar~und 
eth . of thde1r city, .sometimes in the older neighborhoods, sometimes 
Ilic, an sometimes black b t ft 
th . . h , u o en encompassing a great area of 
e1r ne1g borhood.13 
The legislative hist · 
Proxmire stated "Th or~ contams_ several examples of redlining. Senator 
Disclosure Act] , e ata provided by that act [the Home Mortgage 
remove any doubt that redl· . . d d . 
itworthy areas a d . d 
1 
mmg m ee exists, that many cred-
re eme oans "14 Senator p . . d 
banks in Bro kl . · roxm1re cite several examples· 
Washington o D ~ !?vested only 11 % of _their deposits in Brooklyn; banks i~ 
Angeles Ch'. . . Cmlvested 90% of their depos.its outside of the city; Los 
' icago, eveland and St L · fc d f Accordin t ' · ouis su tere rom disinvestment 1s 
g o a survey of Washington D C b k d . 
Committ B . ' · · an s con ucted by the Senate 
ee on anking Ho us. d U b 
of making I ' mg, an r an Affairs, one bank had a policy 
home mo tno 1olme ~ortgage loans and a savings and loan made 99% of its 
r gage oans m the suburbs.16 
According to CRA' 
local credit needs f; s;up~orters, when banks export capital, they fail to meet 
of these communit~: I7~~ngl si:ll businesses, and farms, to the detriment 
their funds to th : ea so ow that small town banks sometimes ship 
the detriment of~ m~~ m~ney markets in search of higher interest rates to 
credit needs "IS S oc ousmg: to the detriment of small business, and f;rm 
ta · I . enator Proxmire stated, "This denial of credit wh·l "t . 
m y not the sole cause of our urban b ' J e I is cer-
urban decline."19 pro !ems, undoubtedly aggravates 
Senator Proxmire seemed tot k I ffi 
port: "[T]he b nki . d a e mora o ense at redlining and capital ex-
rather than co~f n.g m ut:stry must be ~ncouraged to reinvest in local needs 
REITS [Real Est::u~~:~r:;~; ieculative loans to shaky foreign regimes, to 
bank insiders and all of th th rusts], to unnecessary supertanker fleets, to 
to get credit ~hile o I le o er qu.e~tionable ventures that have managed 
ur oca commumt1es starve."20 He asserted that m any of 
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Similarly, Congress indicated that the success of federal development prograJJ15 
"depends in large part upon the availability of private capital, particularly as 
made available through local lending and financial institutions."44 As Senator 
Proxmire stated, "[I] t is possible that the Federal Government may put in 3 
few billion dollars this year or over the next few years to help rebuild our citi~5· 
But it will be peanuts compared to what the financial institutions can put 111' 
if they have the will to do it."4S . 
When he introduced the CRA, Senator Proxmire justified the effort to in· 
fluence banks to lend in redlined neighborhoods as a quid pro quo.46 He stated 
that the public charter that banks receive justifies imposing public obligatioJlS 
d ·n on banks.47 "[A] public charter conveys numerous economic benefits an 1 
return it is legitimate for public policy and regulatory practice to require so~'. 
public purpose ... . "48 He listed several benefits of a bank charter. Banks enJ0l 
protection against competition from other businesses. Banks hold a "semi-et 
elusive franchise:'49 Senator proxmire elaborated, "The Government limits the 
entry of other potential competitors into that area if such entry would u~dul~ 
jeopardize existing financial institutions."so The government also restncte 
"competition [among banks] by limiting the rate of interest payable on sav· 
ings deposits and prohibiting any interest on demand deposits."s1 The gov· 
ernment provides low-cost deposit insurance.s2 Finally, the governmeJl; 
provides low-cost credit through the Federal Reserve Banks and the Feder3 
Home Loan Banks. S3 
CRA Enforcement 
Criteria for Evaluating a Bank's Record of Meeting 
Community Credit Needs 
The legislative history contains a discussion about how to evaluate a banJ<'S 
record of meeting the credit needs of the community. This discussion shed~ 
light on the difference between allocating credit and influencing banks to leJl 
more in redlined neighborhoods, further supports the proposition th31 
Congress intended the CRA to influence banks to lend in redlined neighbof' 
hoods, and provides some guidance regarding criteria for evaluating CRA pef' 
formance that influence banks to lend in redlined neighborhoods but do n°
1 
allocate credit. ·i 
As initially introduced, the CRA included a mandatory loan-to-dep051 
ratio fo r evaluating a bank's record at meeting local credit needs. The cJVI 
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would have required banks to indicate, subject to regulatory approval, the per-
centage of their deposits that they would lend in their local communities.s4 
J-_Iowever, Senator Proxmire dropped this provision in light of strong opposi-
t10n that this mandatory loan-to-deposit ratio would have constituted credit 
allocation.ss 
The CRA's subsequent legislative history contains suggestions of the sorts 
of criteria the agencies could utilize in evaluating the CRA performance of a 
bank. Although not explicit, the discussions imply that it would be appropri-
a_te to adopt criteria for evaluating CRA performance composed of quantita-
tive measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks of community credit 
'.
1eeds, and objective standards for evaluating bank lending. For example, there 
is a suggestion that a bank's lending could be evaluated by comparing its per-
~ormance to demand, measured by all loan applications received by all banks 
111 the community and the number of loans banks make in the community.s6 
The legislative history also suggests a quasi-objective standard for evaluating 
whether a bank's lending meets community credit needs: whether the bank is 
lending a "disproportionate" amount of credit outside the community.57 
Alt_hough the term "disproportionate" is not precise and is open to interpre-
tation, the legislative history contains some guidance about its meaning. The 
Senate Report states that although Congress "rejected the course of setting per-
centage targets for reinvestment, it should be self-evident that an institution 
~xporting 99 percent of its dollars outside of the city in which it is chartered 
IS not serving community convenience and needs."s8 The Report contin ues 
that, in contrast, some savings and loans had been able to lend 80% of their 
deposits locally with no adverse effects on bank safety and soundness.s9 The 
r~port cited one bank that had gone from making 1 % of its loans within its 
city to 20%.60 In the Senate debates on the CRA, Senator Proxmire stated that 
Brooklyn and Washington, D.C. were suffering from disinvestment; banks in 
those areas were lending 89% and 90% of their deposits, respectively, else-
whe'.e·61 Finally, a colloquy between Senator Proxmire and Vincent J. Quinn, 
pres1.?~nt and chairman of the board of the Brooklyn Savings Bank, suggests 
th_at disproportionate" might be defined by comparing a bank's performance 
with other ba~s' performances based on their relative sizes. Accord ing to 
Senator ~roxm1re, Brooklyn Savings Bank, with $1.1 billion in assets, made 
52 ~oans 111 Brooklyn in 1975, compared with the smaller GreenPoint Bank 
which made 722 loans.62 ~uinn defended Brooklyn Savings Bank by assertin~ 
th~t .there was not suffici ent demand for loans in Brooklyn for all banks to 
originate the same percentage of their assets in loans 
1
·n B kl 
G p · roo yn as 
reen omt Bank.63 Proxmire responded by stating "[W]I 
' 1en you compare 
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these, it looks as if this bank [GreenPoint] was more aggressive and active and 
serviced its community more effectively than your large bank did."64 
Arthur Burns, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, outlined similar 
criteria the federal banking agencies would have to utilize if the CRA were en-
acted.65 The federal banking agencies would have to identify the credit needs 
of the community, determine the extent to which they were being met, and 
determine whether a particular bank was doing its share. Burns opposed the 
CRA on the grounds that this would be unduly burdensome.66 
Sanctions for Failing to Meet Community Credit Needs 
Another way the legislative history of the CRA sheds light on the difference 
between allocating credit and influencing bank lending decisions and further 
indicates that Congress did not intend to allocate credit but did intend to in-
fluence banks to lend in underserved neighborhoods is Congress' considera-
tion of sanctions for banks that do not satisfy their CRA obligations. Instead 
of imposing the sort of mandatory lending orders on a bank for failing to sat-
isfy its CRA obligations that would accompany credit allocation, the sanction 
was "relatively weak."67 Senator Proxmire stated, "You're not going to put a 
bank out of business if they don't loan locally."68 Congress intended the fed-
eral banking agencies to use their authority to "encourage financial institu· 
tions to help meet local credit needs."69 
Despite the fact that there were no mandatory sanctions, the agencies' en-
couragement was to be strong. The CRA required the federal banking agen-
cies to "use the full extent of their authority .. . to encourage all regulated 
depository institutions' responsiveness to community needs."70 Representative 
Ashley, a CRA supporter in the House, stated that the CRA "reaffirms and 
strengthens the powers of the federal financial supervisory agencies to assure 
that federally regulated financial institutions meet the credit needs of their 
communities."71 
The legislative history indicates that this regulatory encouragement was to 
be both formal and informal. As to formal encouragement, the federal bank 
ing agencies would use their authority when examining banks and consider-
ing bank expansion applications to encourage them to lend in their 
communities.72 According to Senator Proxmire, a poor CRA record would be 
grounds for denying an application, but this remedy was not mandatory. "We 
provided that when a bank wanted to open a branch the regulating agencies 
would have to take into account how much they invested locally, and the1 
might have this as a decisive consideration under some circumstances."73 AJ1 
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ex
1
ample from the legislative history of a formal effort was a state banking reg-
u ator th t . . 
t " a required city banks that wanted to open a branch in the suburbs 
0~ ~mphasize lending to their inner city areas as a precondition for approval 
t e new suburban branch."74 
w ~s to informal encouragement, Senator Proxmire stated, "the record shows 
in: a~e to do something to nudge them, influence them, persuade them to 
in :s~ .111 their community."75 The legislative history cites examples of instances 
the F tch regulatory persuasion resulted in increased lending.76 In one case, 
and leder~l Home Loan Bank Board, responding to complaints that a savings 
n· t ?an 111 Washington, D.C. made 99% of its mortgage loans outside the 
is net u d h . . . 
in h ' rge t e savings and loan to take affirmative steps to increase lend-
ing ~ ere.77 As a result, the savings and loan increased its proportion of lend-
g in the D' · . 
in th . . tstnct to 20%.78 According to the Senate Report, other branches 
feet ,,e ~tstnct were able to make 80% of their Joans there with no "adverse ef-
ma:· t us the "Bank Board's suggestion that the [savings and loan] take affi.r-
ap tve ~teps to publicize the availability of credit to city residents was 
propnate under the circumstances . ... "79 
Opposition to the CRA 
ba~e opponents of the CRA, including the heads of three of the four federal 
the ng regulatory agencies,80 had several objections to the CRA. Primarily, 
eq:a aiued t.hat the CRA was or would lead to credit allocation, and they 
Sen te credit allocation with credit quotas. During the Senate Hearings, 
of cat~~ Tower stated, "This proposal would, as I read it, provide for a scheme 
R.ep~:t it}Uocation ... . "81 According to the opposition statement in the Senate 
free fl ' The enactment of this Section would have adverse effects upon the 
'cred· ow of capital within our economy, and 'a rose by any other name' is still 
it al!ocat' '"82 d. ion. Accor mg to Senator Morgan, the CRA: 
IS · 
a significant step in the direction of credit allocation by the Con-
~~e.ss of the United States. If bills of this nature are pushed to their 
r hmate conclusion, then the day will come when a financial institu-
10; may be forced to make an unsound loan in a specific location in 
or er to meet its quota of loans in a given locality.83 
!::~~~: ~ugar stated, "This perennial attempt to provide credit allocation, to 
the b . Y law some reason why loans must be made at the penalty of losing 
usmess, is simply a gesture in futility."84 Senator Tower stated, "I do not 
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think that we should indul e in h . . 
a system of cred't all . g t e authorization or, indeed, the mandate of 
1 ocat1on "85 s t S h . . 
step in the direct' f .' .. · ena or c mitt argued that the CRA "is a 
ion o credit all t' b 
According to the CRA's 
0 
oca ion Y ?overnment agencies."86 
cause it unduly· t c d . pponents, credit allocation was undesirable be-
m er1ere with th f k 
unsound loans C d 't ll . e ree mar et and could force banks to make 
· re 1 a ocat1 " [ d] 
to places they are needed "87 Th~~ cr~at e barriers to the free flow of funds 
as a constantly sh ·ft· " · RA's opponents described the United States 1 mg patchwork of · 1 h 
ities" that had b . capita s ort and capital surplus local-
een overcome m 1 b 
gage documents th ' arge part, Y the standardization of mort-
' e secondary m t f 
geographic lending lim't 88 Th or gage market, and the weakening o 
go to the areas where it ':~uld :~ee fl~w of funds ensured that money would 
ply of mortgage funds would b~ c the highest return, guaranteed that the sup-
of mortgages by g . onstant where needed, and reduced the cost 
uaranteelllg mort 
areas where the de d c gage money would be available even in 
man tOr mortg I f 
money to make mortg 89 T age oans was greater than the supply o . . ages. he CRA o 
s1zmg the need to meet 1 1 . ' pponents argued, by" ( o ]verempha-oca credit ne d '11 d' and disrupt the fl f . e s WI 1scourage the free flow of funds 
ow o credit fro · 1 areas."90 The CRA" Id b m capita surplus areas to capital short 
b . wou e a ste b k f arners to the free fl f fu P ac ward, encouraging the creation o 
argued, "Nothing co~~ o il' nds to places they are needed."91 Senator Tower 
ket-regulated economy thm Itate m~re strongly against the vitality of a mar-
d. an a growu ere 1t allocation would c b 1g system of credit allocation."92 Finally, 
th. b tOrce anks to ak . ky 
is, anks would leave th . m e ns loans, and rather than doing 
Similar arguments w e neighborhoods the CRA intended them to serve.93 
th H ere made two l' d 
e ome Mortgage n· 1 years ear 1er when Congress considere I isc osure Act ("HMD " . . 
c 0. se the location of th · al A ), which required lenders to d1s-
d eir re estate 1 d I gue that it would 11 . -re ate oans.94 Opponents of HMDA ar-
all . a ocate credit HMD ' . 
ocation as a quota.95 Th · As opponents characterized credit 
negative effect: "Q t ey argued that credit allocation would have the same 
w Id b uo a systems are a £ f . 
ou e taking from s orm o credit rationing. This means we 
owne d · . omeone, the small b · 
r, an g1vmg to so USIIless or the suburban home-
Th meone else in th ' . , 6 
.e opponents of the CRA mad ' is case the mner city homeowner: 9 
the bill did not define k e ?ther arguments as well. They argued that 
bank' l d' ey terms, did not · 
s en 1ng record and th . contam standards for evaluating a 
ulations 97 Th ' at it would th c b . . . 
. · e CRA, the ere10re e 1mposs1ble to issue reg-
the mstit t' ' Y argued, would · " 
u ton s record of . require bank examiners to assess 
yet the b'll meetmg the cred't 
b ' 
1 sets out no criter· . 1 needs of its primary service area; 
e based "98 0 ia or gu1delin . . . 
· PPonents argued th . es upon which this assessment 1s to 
at it would b . . 
e impossible to define a proper 
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rein:~stment ratio.99 They also argued that the law would burden banks with 
~dditional paperwork. JOO They believed that voluntary efforts to increase lend-
mg were preferable and already underway.101 Opponents argued that the CRA 
was unnecessary because other federal laws, such as the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the various provisions 
of the federal banking laws that required banks to meet the convenience and 
nee~s of their communities, prohibited redlining. 102 
. Fmally, recognizing that one purpose of the CRA was to increase lending 
Ill redlined neighborhoods, the CRA's opponents claimed it would have the 
?Pposite effect. 103 It "would .. . have the adverse effect of causing a reduction 
Ill ~redit availability in these areas which we are trying so desperately to revi-
talize."104 They argued that the CRA would deter banks from entering areas in 
need of revitalization for fear of the obligation to meet local credit needs. 105 
In a letter to Senator Morgan, former Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns 
state?, "to the extent that this or any other sanction should prove effective in 
causmg credit to flow substantially into an area on the basis of non-market 
~orc~s, entry by depository institutions into other similar areas would likely 
e discouraged."106 Similarly, Senator Schmitt stated: 
The requirement that financial regulatory agencies allocate credit 
under this or any other scheme can have adverse effects. By forcing 
financial institutions to make loans of dubious quality, the Congress 
would easily convince financial institutions to close branches in de-
caying neighborhoods and thus, lead to further economic and social 
decline in these areas.107 
Finally, opponents argued that the CRA's additional paperwork and bureau-
cracy would further discourage banks from opening branches in redlined 
areas.108 
Response to the CRA's Opponents 
CRA supporters denied that it allocated credit, and in making this denial 
co~firmed that the CRA would influence banks to lend more in redlined 
neighborhoods. The Senate Report states: 
Charters have never constituted licenses to ignore local credit needs. 
The~efore, the Committee rejects the assertion that this Title allocates 
er.edit. It simply underscores the long-standing obligation to an in-
stitution's local service area implicit in existing law.109 
22 
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HECRA 
~na~or Proxmire also denied that 
eanngs, he stated, "It does ~e CRA allocated credit. In the Senate 
we could d · not ProVIde £ d" 
o, in my opinion w Id b or ere it allocation. The worst thing 
to allocate ' ou e to em D 
. so much credit to th· power r. Burns or anyone else 
introducing the CRA Sen t tps sector and so much credit to that one " 110 Jn 
q · " • a or ro · · 
. u1re mandatory quotas o b xm1re stated that the CRA would not re-
1t wo Id · fl ' r a ureau · 
c u in uence banks to 1 d . crattc credit allocation scheme." i 11 But 
ior bi" en 111 r di" d 
. hpu ic policy and regulato e .me neighborhoods: "it is legitimate 
wit out the d ry practice to · 
S 
nee for costly sub ·d· ,, require some public purposes, 
enators Sarba s1 1es . ... 11 2 
nes and p . cated d. roxm1re al · · . 
ere it when they stated th s~ imphc1tly denied that the CRA allo-
to do anyth · at noth111g · h 1, 
b k 
tng that was cont 111 t e CRA would require a bani-
an .113 Th C . rary to the £ 
b'U . e RA itself would t sa e and sound operation of the 
t~ is very, very careful in ma~o ~ermit this. Senator Sarbanes stated, "The 
e safe and s d ng 1t clear that · . . . . . 
tion .. 114 S oun operation of th . . ' 
10 meetmg this responsibiht)'• 
not. b .enator Proxmire, in introd e '.nstttution has paramount considera· 
su stttute th · d ucmg the CRA " . 
ind· ·d e JU gment of th , stated, The bill also does 
b tv.1 ual loans. Each bank e :egulator for the judgment of a banker on 
est Judgme t . . or sav111gs ass . . . . 
b n on 1nd1vidual 1 ociatton will be free to exercise its not e . Oan a [" · 
and s imxosed on banks because t:P icattons."11s Mandatory quotas could 
1 °.un ness concerns.116 S ey would always be overridden by safet}' oans in redli d upporters of th 
"M ne commun·t· e CRA also did not believe that 
oreover th . t tes Were i h 
reinv t ' .ere is no reason to n erently riskier than other loans· 
es ment is . assume th t h" h . 
gued th . incompatible with b nk a a tg er degree of commun1t}' 
at it was riskier to lend out ~d safety."111 In fact, CRA supporters ar-
F. s1 e of a b k' 1 1nally, there is no e . an s ocal community: 
ten into fin . v1dence that banks . . 
ties 0 ancial difficulty by . or thnft mstitutions have got-. n the c ovennvesf · h · 
by b k ontrary, most of th mg 111 t e1r local communi-
an s aros f e recent fi · l · s 1 . e rom rnakin · . nancia difficulties suffered pecu attve I g tns1der 1 
tered 118 oans outside the co .oa~s to affiliated persons and 
· mmunity h. h 
111 w 1c the bank was char-
When intr d . 
'" 0 UCtng th 
~nvestment by fin . e .CRA, Senator Pr . . . . 
n ks greater th ancia] institution . h ~xmire summarized these beliefs. 
I an thos s 1n t e1r c · · · 1 e ess risk be e normally tak b 0 mmumt1es need not mvo" 
cause of th en y p d 
Senator p . e lender's fi h ru ent lenders, and often involves 
. roxrn1re cit d trst and k 1 ,, 19 
v1ously redlin d e a program in Phil now edge of his community. i 
e areas th adel h · rate elsewhere 120 at had a dee 1 
P ta to make mortgages in pre· 
. iau t rate f 0 ult o .6%, similar to the defa 
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Amendments to the CRA 
l Congress made nine significant amendments to the CRA or other banking aws on . d'f 
t six 1 ferent occasions. Congress intended the first five amendments 
;h refine and strengthen the CRA's influence over bank lending decisions . 
net~e of these five amendments influence banks to lend more in redlined 
s· ~ borhoods by expanding CRA-related public disclosure requirements. The 
t:r £and seventh amendments strengthened the CRA by expanding it to cover 
we onnation of financial conglomerates. The eighth and ninth amendments 
b erekadopted to weaken the CRA's influence. The eighth am endment requires an s a d 
ninth n community groups to disclose CRA agreements they make and the 
fa t reduces the frequency of CRA examinations of small banks with satis-
c ory b or etter CRA records. 
FIRREA Amendment 
In the F' · . . f i 989 (" inancial Institut10ns Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act o 
bank· FIRREA''),121 Congress amended the CRA to require that the federal 
Uaf tng agencies disclose to the public their written CRA performance eval-
tons ofb k . . 
wh· h an s, the CRA ratmgs they assigned to banks, and the facts upon 
ingtc the ratings were based.1 22 Prior to this, the written evaluation and rat-
fon:ere confidential. Congress intended public disclosure of the CRA per-
Publiance evaluation reports to strengthen CRA enforcement "by allowing the 
tion c to know both what regulatory agencies are telling depository institu-
insti: a~d what the community reinvestment records of particular depository 
Pos Uhons are."123 Congress intended this amendment to reiterate the pur-
es of th CRA . . 
hou . e , tighten CRA standards, and influence banks to make more 
toe Stng, small business, and small farm loans.124 The amendment "will help 
nsure that fi · l · · · · · · N · ·11 main . nancia mstttut10ns m communities across our at10n w1 re-
FI~l~ an~ active members of the very communities they serve."125 
Con /\s legislative history also provides guidance about the types of credit 
Congress ~as especially interested in influencing banks to make available.126 
gress ind· d . . 1 emph . tcate that CRA performance evaluat10ns should place specia 
mode as is ~n a bank's record "of serving the housing credit needs of low- and 
need rate-income persons, small business credit needs, small farm credit 
the ~~nd rural economic development."121 Thus, FIRREA's amendments to 
their 
0 
. '.among other FIRREA provisions, "return [ed] savings and loans to 
inco rtginal purpose, mortgage lending, including for low- and moderate-
me people."128 
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FDICIA Amendment 
" In the Federal Deposit I 
( FDICIA'') 129 nsurance Corp · 
St h 
. ' Congress amended h oration Improvement Act of 1991 
rengt en it bT t e CRA 
on FI , s a. 1 1ty to influence bank . on~e again in an attempt to 
. RREAs disclosure requ · lending dec1sions.130 FDICIA expanded 
c1es to discl irements by r .. 
. ose the data that su equirmg the federal banking agen-
ra t111g 131 C b' pport the· . 
c · om med with PIRRE , . ir conclusions about the bank's CRA 
1or more ho · As d1sclos . 
req . . using, small business d ure requirements and its support 
othu1nng disclosure of the data ,ban small farm loans, FDICIA's provision 
er strength · a out a bank' CRA 
b en111g of CRA's · fl s record represented an-so y helping t d fi m uence over b k 1 . 
· 0 e ne and d" 1 an endmg decisions. It does c1es use to ev I isc ose the sta d d 
S a uate a bank's re d n ar s the federal banking agen-enate Repo cor at meef . 
rt on the amendme t mg community credit needs. As the 
n stated: 
Disclosure will k . 
ma e it po "bi . community . ss1 e fo r mtere t d . 
fi · 1 organizations de . s e parties (e.g. Congress, c1a s) to d . , pos1tory · · . 
etermme the und 1 . institutions, state and local of-use to eval er Ylllg stand d 
b uate and rate CRA ar sand cri teria regulators etter able t d performa S 
. 0 etermine how nee. uch parties will then be 
assign to . much er d"bil" 
t d 
a particular CRA 
1 
. e 1 tty and weight they should 
en s that . eva uation or · 
b . ' over time 1·mpl ratmg. The Committee in-nng g ' ement f 
reater uniformity and .a ion of the amendment should 
consistency t h 
BCDA and RTCA A 
mendm 
o t e CRA process.132 
Congress amended th ents 
Refinancing, Restr . e CRA as part of th R . 
the Housin uctunng, and Im r e esolut1on Trust Corporation 
The 1992 H~ and Community Devefo ovement Act of 1991 ("RTCA'') 133 and 
federal ba k' DA amendment stated thP~ent Act of 1992 (" 1992 HCDA").134 
n 1ng ag · at in as · 
dertaken by b kse~cies could consid I .sessmg a bank's CRA record, the 
an 111 er end111g d · . . . or low-incom cooperation w·th . an mvestment act1v1ties un-
e credit · 1 mmor· ty d needs of th b , unions as lo 1 - an woman-owned banks 
e ank s co ng as such t' · . · 
men ts wh rnmunity 135 U d ac 1v1ties help meet the credit 
' en eval · · n er th RT 
may consider uating a bank's CRA e CA and 1992 HCDA amend-
d . as a posif f record th c d . 0 mmantly . . ive actor a b k' ' e 1e era] banking agencies 
't k m111onty an s prov·d· 
a en togeth h community or t . 1 mg a branch located in a pre-. fl er, t ese . o a nun . 6 
Ill uence bank t provisions can b on ty- or woman -owned bank.13 
s o assist minority- de seen as an attempt to use the CRA to 
an worna 
n-owned banks and low-incorne 
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er d" 
b e It unions, presumably because these financial institutions, in turn, could 
e counted on to help m eet the credit needs o f redlined neighborhoods. 
Riegle-Neal Amendment 
of ~~:art of.the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficien cy Act 
C 4, which allowed banks to open branches in more than one state, 
a ongress amended the CRA to require the federal banking agencies to prepare 
in:eparate CRA performance evaluation for each state in which a bank with 
erstate b h h 1 · d 111 ranc es as at east one bran ch.
137 Congress passed this am en -
deent ~o alleviate concerns that banks would use interstate banki ng to siphon 
hoPosits from new states in which they opened branches to make loans in their 
of ~e states.13s Congress stated that this provision ensures that the principles 
not f,e CRA would be followed in interstate banking.139 "(C]ommunities need 
of ear that increasing geographic opportunities for banks will deprive them 
no~~eded capital. ... These provisions are designed to ensure that banks will 
Stat J~st vacuum up deposits in some States and reinvest them in other 
es. '140 
GLBA Amendments 
Ste;h~ Gramm-Leach-Billey Act of 1999 ("GLBA''), which repealed the Glass-
the ~a Act and certain provisions of the Banking Act of 1933,141 and amended 
had ank Bolding Company Act of 1956 and other federal banking laws that 
nes Prohibited banks from engaging in the securities and insurance busi-
ses, 142 al 
ame d so amended the CRA and other related laws.143 Three CRA-related 
nes n men ts prohibit banks from engaging in the insurance or securities busi-
C~s unle~s they received at least a satisfactory rating on their most recent 
term ex:arn111ations, require banks and community groups to disclose the 
natios of CRA agreements they enter, and limit the frequency of CRA exami-
a co ns of small banks.144 These CRA-related provisions of the GLBA reflect 
mpro · 
new b . rnise between supporters of the CRA, who hoped to extend it to the 
hopedusin~ss~s in which banks could engage,145 and Senator Phil Gramm, who 
abilit to ~1rn1t the CRA's influence.146 As such, the GLBA's effect on the CRA's 
D Ydto influence banks to lend in redlined neighborhoods is mixed. 
nan ~ t the GLBA, a bank holding com pany ("BHC") m ust become a fi-
bus~a holding company ("FHC") to engage in the securi ties or insurance 
bank esses,. b.ut a BHC is not permitted to form an FHC unless all of the BHC's 
subsidiaries received at least satisfactory ratings on their most recen t 
28 TH E LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CRA 
Conclusion 
The legislative history of the CRA shows that in passing the CRA, Congress 
intended to influence banks to lend more in LMI, minority, and inner-citY 
neighborhoods. Congress passed the CRA in light of evidence that banks had 
redlined these neighborhoods and exported their capital elsewhere. In light of 
this, the CRA has a dual purpose-to end redlining and to increase lendiJJS 
in redlined neighborhoods. Supporters of the CRA made clear, however, that 
while it was intended to influence banks to lend more in such neighborhoods, 
the CRA was not intended to create a system of government-imposed credit 
allocation. With two exceptions, amendments to the CRA and related ba1¥ 
ing laws generally strengthened the CRA's influence, primarily through i11' 
creasing the amount of information available about bank lending and 
requiring the federal banking agencies to focus on home mortgage, small busi· 
ness, and small farm lending when evaluating banks for CRA compliance. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 
OF THE CRA 
Introduction 
c~e~ecting congressional intent as expressed in its legislative history, the 
. 1~ structured in a way that influences banks to lend in their local com-
munities a d · 1 · I · ity . n m ow- and moderate-income ("LMI"), predommant Y mmor-
d 'and mner-city neighborhoods (collectively "redlined" neighborhoods), but 
oe
1
s. ~ot set quotas or force them to allocate credit. However, while the CRA 
e:xp 1c1tly st t h · d · d e . . a es t at banks have an obligation to meet credit nee s, it oes not 
:crhcitly ban credit allocation This suggests that the federal banking agen-
c1es1 m c · . . 
. ay entorce the CRA in a way that broadly defines the affirmative obli-
gation on b k d' II . T an s to meet credit needs but narrowly defines ere 1t a ocat10n. 
c d?e CRA states that banks have an affirmative obligation to help meet the 
re it need f th · · b h d 'th s . so e1r local communities including LMI neigh or oo s, w1 out 
apecifying how much a bank must lend. The CRA requires the federal banking 
genc1es to · · · d fh l i exam me mdividual banks periodically to assess thelf recor so e p-
ng to meet d ' · I din · fo ere it needs, to publish an evaluation report- me u g a ratmg-
r each b nk 'd . a li a , and to take the bank's record into account when cons1 ermg an 
PP cation b th b · fil ·th th Y e ank to expand. Members of the public can e comment WI 
e agencies th li · b th b on ese applications. The agencies can deny an app canon ecause 
e ank h . . 
by . fl ~s not met its CRA obligations. The CRA thus democratizes capital 
co In uencmg banks to lend more to redlined communities and by giving these 
allnun~nities a voice in bank lending decisions. But the CRA does not do this by ocatmg d' . . do ere it. The CRA does not impose specific lending targets on banks. It 
~~~l ~ . ank available en g quotas or specify the amount of credit b s are to make 
tain ' to whom, for what purpose, or on what terms. The CRA does not con-
mandatory penalties for a bank that fails to meet community credit needs. 
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